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While the study of economic inequality is still much of a Cinderella ﬁeld in
Economics, and takes up only a minuscule part of the attention of sociol-
ogists and political scientists, there are signs that this neglect is changing
signiﬁcantly, and rapidly so. Over the past decade there has been a sharp
increase in the intensity with which academics and practitioners are engaging
with the skewed distribution of income, wealth and economic opportunity in
general. New theoretical approaches spearheaded by Amartya Sen and others
since the early 1990s, the emergence of more comprehensive sets of data on
income distribution in particular, and growing public and specialised
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DOI: 10.1080/01436590600720934 689combined to put economic inequality squarely back in the academic and
public focus.
1 In the new century inequality studies have become something
of an academic growth industry: since the turn of the century there have been
major world conferences on the theme, the creation of a specialised journal
and a specialised academic association,
2 many papers and journal articles,
and a number of major single- and multi-author books, reports and edited
collections. In 2004 and 2005 alone four major studies on the subject saw the
light of day. These, plus an important web-based source of information on
economic inequality form the focus of this review article.
But why is economic inequality a problem? After all, is the rank ordering
of people in terms of wealth and status not inescapable in all societies in
which there are norms of behaviour to which sanctions are attached, as
Ralph Dahrendorf argued in the 1960s?
3 Contrary to the assumption that
inequality is an aberration from a presumed original position in which a
‘natural’ equality exists among all people, Dahrendorf argues that inequality
is coterminous with the emergence of a norm-governed, law-based society
which discriminates between people to the extent that they conform or do not
conform with the reigning normative expectations. Norms, and their
codiﬁcation in positive law, place requirements on people’s behaviour, and
a rank order of social status and the accompanying diﬀerentiation of wealth
is bound to emerge. In Dahrendorf’s felicitous prose: while people may be
equal before the law, it belongs to the very logic of society formation that
people end up being unequal after the law, that is, when their performance in
terms of the norms/laws receives positive or negative sanctions. Inequality of
status and wealth is thus a ‘natural’ state of human society, and acts as an
important source of incentive for people towards betterment.
In addition, the mere eventuality of inequality of income or wealth cannot
in itself be the cause of moral concern. If a billionaire would move into the
middle-class street where I live in Dunedin, New Zealand, economic
inequality in that street would worsen dramatically, but no one would be
disadvantaged nor any other moral sentiment breached. In fact, all property
owners in the street would be advantaged as the relative values of their
property would increase. Does this not imply that we should not waste our
moral and analytical energies on inequality, but rather direct them at ‘real’
moral challenges, such as the prevalence of absolute deprivation, poverty,
which results in millions of people not having their basic needs met?
Furthermore, if it turns out that free market entrepreneurship is an eﬀective
way of reducing the incidence of poverty, risking the concomitant higher
inequality meets the requirements of both economic functionality and of
Rawls’ inﬂuential ethical principles. This implies that inequality is justiﬁed
only if there is procedural justice in place and if unequal outcomes maximise
the utility of the worse-oﬀ.
Of course, as the books under review show, hardly any real existing
economic inequality can live up to these ethical requirements. In most highly
unequal countries economic inequality goes hand in hand with dispropor-
tionate access to public power and positions of inﬂuence, and procedural
rules are often skewed in favour of the economically privileged. In these
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and improve their social standing, but is often a ‘trap’ from which generation
after generation of the same people cannot escape, disrupting their potential
for human development and the economic growth prospects of the society to
which they belong. The message that emerges from the books under review is
that extreme levels of inequality are indeed problematical: extreme inequality
implies that a section of the population is persistently, across generations,
denied the opportunities for economic betterment enjoyed by others in that
society, despite the existence of suﬃcient resources on a global scale to
provide the basic needs of all. Broadly speaking, economic inequality refers
to any state of aﬀairs in which there is a contrast in the economic
opportunities that persons or groups of persons face. As Debraj Ray puts it:
‘Ultimately, economic inequality is the fundamental disparity that permits
one individual certain material choices, while denying another individual
those very same choices’.
4 These concerns do not imply that economic
equality is necessarily preferable or morally more defensible as an alternative
to inequality, but they do suggest that a fair distribution of economic
resources and opportunities, that is, economic equity, is a worthwhile goal to
pursue. While Dahrendorf is correct in seeing hierarchy and inequality as
inescapable features of society, there clearly are limits to what would be
regarded as morally justiﬁable inequalities. The inequality caused by the
relocation of a millionaire to a speciﬁc street, as in the example above,
becomes a moral concern if there are structural barriers to other inhabitants
in the street becoming millionaires as well. Such barriers seem to be common
in many low- and middle-income countries, and have recently emerged in
many OECD member states as well.
The conclusion that inequality can be iniquitous has become well estab-
lished among moral philosophers, and the books under review do not add
much that is novel on this score. Their distinct contribution and novelty value
lies rather in the way in which they show that equity is not only an abstract
moral concern, but that its pursuit makes considerable diﬀerence to the eco-
nomic performance and overall human development of societies. While not
diminishing the importance of poverty and poverty relief, the hard-nosed
economic analyses that underlie most of the work reﬂected in these books
indicate that analysts and policy makers need to take an urgent and hard look
attheproblemsposed byinequalityandatways ofdealing withtheseproblems
andtheir root causes.Commentatorswho havelamentedthedisappearanceof
the concept of redistribution from most of the policy debates of the past 20
years will take heart from the fact that an auspicious international ﬁnancial
institution such as the World Bank has, through its ﬂagship development
publication, put the theme squarely back into the public debate. Whether this
was indeed the intention of George W Bush when he dispatched Paul
Wolfowitz to the World Bank in early 2005 is unlikely, but the gestation
period of the annual World Development Report is quite long, and the ideas
behind Equity and Development have been percolating up for some time now
in World Bank circles. One of the early victims of this percolating process was
none other than Branko Milanovic, one of the authors under review here. The
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itself an indication of the ‘return of inequality’.
What exactly is it about inequality within national units that makes it a
challenge from the viewpoint of economic eﬃciency and human develop-
ment? Three of the books under review, coupled with the data generated by
the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP), help us to answer this
question in the next few pages. A fourth—Milanovic’s volume—enables us to
place this debate into a necessary broader perspective of global inequality,
which is where we start.
The constituents of global inequality
The debate about the relevance of inequality has been much informed, but
also confounded, by the question of global inequality. When using this term,
analysts usually have in mind the disproportionate distribution of wealth and
income between the countries of the world, often expressed in terms of per
capita national income. But, as we will soon see, it is a misnomer to restrict
the meaning of global inequality to this between-country dimension. This
misnaming is regrettable in view of the amount of energy spent recently on
the stale debate about whether globalisation has reduced or increased global
inequality. If only participants to this debate had read Milanovic before they
embarked on their narrow pursuit of between-country inequality. As do most
recent publications on the bases of data convenience, Milanovic also focuses
on income inequality exclusively. There is general consensus that wealth all
over the world is more unequally distributed than income, but that conclu-
sions pertaining to income distribution would generally apply to wealth
inequality as well.
Milanovic carefully distinguishes between three ways in which to think
about and measure global or world income inequality. One is the narrow
conception referred to above, which sees global inequality as being consti-
tuted by the disproportionality in mean national income across the countries
of the world. This approach assumes that each country has only one repre-
sentative citizen, earning the mean income, and then compares the incomes of
these 200 plus country representatives. One can imagine a line of 200 indi-
viduals, arranged from small to tall, each representing one country, with their
relative height being a reﬂection of their country’s mean income. Milanovic
suggests that it is more correct to refer to this as un-weighted international
inequality, as we are comparing countries with one another and we do not
take into consideration the size of the population of the relevant countries.
Much of the recent diﬀerence of opinion about the eﬀects of globalisation on
inequality can be traced back to the question of whether it is appropriate to
make un-weighted comparisons, thus treating China and Liechtenstein as one
unit of comparison each, or whether we should weigh countries for popula-
tion size.
5 In eﬀect, the latter concept of weighted international inequality
would imply that there will now be six billion individuals in our line, with all
the citizens of one country having the same height (¼mean income of their
country).
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and weighted inequality, on the one hand, from a third concept, namely
‘global inequality’ proper, on the other hand. What we as analysts should be
concerned about ideally when we want to make pronouncements on global
inequality, he argues, is the relative position of each individual in the world
line-up, where someone’s position (height) is determined by his or her real
income. In this line-up people from diﬀerent countries may well be
neighbours, as someone’s relative position will depend not on her citizenship
but on her particular real income alone. Although Milanovic does not use the
term, it is obvious that this measure may also be called a cosmopolitan
conception of global inequality, as it focuses on how well each individual in
the world is doing compared to every other individual, independently of their
country of residence or citizenship.
The bad news from such a cosmopolitan perspective is that we do not have
information about the real income of each individual in the world, and that
we therefore have to fall back on what we do have, namely country means
and (often incomplete) data about within-country income distribution. We
can then calculate what the likely income distribution among the individuals
of the world is, using a generalised overall measure of inequality (such as
the Gini coeﬃcient or the Theil statistic
6) and combining information on the
distribution of income within countries with information gleaned from the
population-weighted mean incomes of the countries for which we have data.
By default, therefore, the notion of global income inequality becomes based
on a combination of within-country (national) and between-country (interna-
tional) income comparisons.
Most of Milanovic’s book is spent on working out these conceptual
distinctions and what it means when we apply them to measuring trends in
global and weighted international inequality. In contrast to some other recent
contributions,7 Milanovic is careful not to take easy sides in the debate about
whether globalisation has increased or reduced inequality, showing that
much of the conclusion depends on whether one uses weighted or un-
weighted country income means, and on how one deals with the problem of
comparing the purchasing power of incomes in diﬀerent countries. His
favoured approach is to present the reader with a clear summary of the
reasoning behind diﬀerent measures, and with tables listing the data
generated by diﬀerent approaches, and then letting the reader make up his
or her own mind about the trends and their implications. About one thing
Milanovic is quite partisan, though, and rightly so: current levels of global
inequality are unacceptably high and the fact that we are continuing to
witness so much poverty in a world with abundant resources compels us to
do something about it. He places his hope on between-country redistribution,
arguing against the likes of Rawls that is it not only desirable, but also that it
is increasingly becoming possible, if only (and he agrees that it is a dicey ‘if’)
we could overcome the democratic deﬁcit in the institutions of global
governance.
Milanovic has produced a very useful and timely text, one that will provide
intellectual stimulation and rigour to the debate about global inequality for
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inequality, it has to be faulted for under-emphasising one of the two consti-
tuents of global inequality. The reader will recall the point made above that
by necessity we calculate global income inequality using information about
between-country (international) plus within-country (domestic) inequality.
Because the hot globalisation debate has dealt exclusively with the former,
and Milanovic’s main goal is to contribute to this debate about trends in
international inequality, he has little to say about within-country inequality.
This is unfortunate, given the fact that it can be shown that the contribution
which within-country inequality is making to our calculations of global
inequality is growing, and that within-country inequality is having a whole
series of negative consequences for economic and human development, speci-
ﬁcally in low and middle-income countries, and needs therefore to be at the
heart of any discussion of global justice. Milanovic is not alone in his neglect
of the within-country dimension. In fact, most of the recent moral debates
about global distributive justice have focused on the between-country (inter-
national) dimension alone, while pretending to deal with global inequality.
8
As proponents of moral cosmopolitanism, who set the tone of the debate,
have sought to extend the traditional scope of considerations of distributive
justice, the emphasis has shifted from the national to the international, and
stayed there.
9 As a consequence, within-nation inequality and the determi-
nants and consequences of it have largely been ignored or taken for granted.
The other items under review here each in their own way show that this
neglect must be reversed.
The within-country share of global inequality is growing
While there is much debate, as we noted, about what has been happening to
between-country inequality over the past couple of decades, no one is
disputing that within-country inequality has increased for most countries of
the world during the most recent phase of globalisation. Using data on 73
countries that are available in the World Income Inequality Dataset (WIID)o f
the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United
Nations University (UNU/WIDER), Cornia and his co-authors ﬁnd that
domestic inequality has increased in 48 of them during the last three-to-four
decades of the 20th century. This may be an understatement of the extent of
the recent increase in within-country inequality, given the relatively small
coverage of the WIID. Much broader coverage is achieved by the Estimated
Household Income Inequality (EHII) dataset compiled by the University of
Texas Inequality Project, under the leadership of James K Galbraith. This is
the most comprehensive within-country inequality dataset available, covering
154 countries and containing more than 3000 observations over the period
1963 to 1999. What is especially attractive about this dataset is that it is based
on a source that remains consistent over time, namely the UNIDO dataset on
manufacturing pay or wage inequality. EHII is produced by combining
information from the UNIDO dataset with information from another widely
used dataset of household income inequality, the so-called Deininger and
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10 as well as
other relevant information such as the ratio of manufacturing employment to
total population, the degree to which a country’s population has become
urbanised, and population growth. This information is then combined in a
regression that produces a pooled time-series of estimated household income
inequality for 154 countries.
11
Using the EHII data, Figure 1 traces the average income levels over the eight
semi-decades from 1960 to 1999 for three categories of states, namely devel-
oping low- and middle-income countries (developing LMICs), ex-socialist
transition economies (including China), and high-income countries. Two
trends clearly stand out. First, developing LMICs on average have faired
much worse than the other two groups in terms of inequality levels. We will
shortly return to the signiﬁcance of this. Second, all three groups of states on
average experienced signiﬁcant increases in their inequality levels starting
in the mid to late 1970s in the case of the developing LMICs, and in the 1980s
in the case of the other two groups. Although there are speciﬁc explanations
applicable to the inequality trends of each group, it should be obvious that
there was a systemic tendency to higher levels of inequality over the last three
decades of the 20th century, something that the Cornia book rightly draws
our attention to and explores further in a number of case studies.
FIGURE 1. Inequality trends for three groups of countries, 1960–99.
Sources: Estimated Household Income Inequality Dataset, University of Texas
Inequality Project, available at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/. For a discussion of this
dataset, see J Galbraith, & H Kum, ‘Estimating the inequality of household income:
a statistical approach to the creation of a dense and consistent data set’, Review of
Income and Wealth, 51 (1), 2005, pp 115–143.
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in the calculation of global inequality is increasing relative to the share of
population-weighted between-country inequality. One way to determine how
the ratio of within-country to between-country inequality as a determinant of
global inequality is changing is to look at the long-term trends of these two
dimensions calculated by Bourguignon and Morrisson in a signiﬁcant article
in the American Economic Review
12 and used in the 2006 World Bank’s
World Development Report (of which Bourguignon is the lead author).
13 As
Figure 2 shows, Bourguignon and Morrisson manage to compare the within-
and the population-weighted between-country constituents of global inequal-
ity from the beginning of the industrial era to 1992.
There have clearly been signiﬁcant inequality transitions in the two
centuries since 1820 as the ratio between the two dimensions has repeatedly
changed. Most notable for our purposes are the recent signiﬁcant changes in
the dynamics of both the between-country and the within-country dimen-
sions of global inequality. The big divergence between countries, which
started in the 1800s as certain parts of the world rapidly industrialised while
others did not, continues for most of the 20th century, but there is a distinct
slowing down of the process in the 1980s and 1990s. This conﬁrms that the
latest phase of globalisation has facilitated the mean-income convergence of
countries. Remember, however, that we are speaking here about the
population-weighted mean incomes, so that rapid economic growth in
populous countries (such as China and India) probably accounts for almost
all of this convergence. Also, the mean-income divergence between countries
remains at very high levels, higher than the within-country inequality level of
any state in the world. Signiﬁcantly, the period of the slowing down of
between-country divergence during the second half of the 20th century
coincides, ﬁrst, with the process of decolonisation during the 1950s and 1960s
FIGURE 2. Within- and between-country inequality, 1820–1992.
Note: Theil statistic is used as inequality measure (Y axis).
Source: Based on data reported in F Bourguignon, & C Morrisson, ‘Inequality
among world citizens: 1820–1992’, American Economic Review, 92 (4), 2002,
pp 727–744.
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globalisation which took oﬀ with the lifting of capital constraints starting in
the early 1970s. While between-country inequality was growing at a slower
rate, the signiﬁcant advances made in promoting economically more equal
societies during the heyday of the welfare state were gradually being eroded
from the 1950s onwards, with a noticeable increase in the average levels of
income inequality since the 1970s. The era of decolonisation and globalisa-
tion may have had many salutary eﬀects, but keeping a lid on within-country
inequality was clearly not one of them. The result of the slowing down of
between-country divergence and the worsening of the within-country ratio
has been that the ratio of within-country inequality to between-country
inequality has grown from 0.64 to 1 in 1970, to 0.67 to 1 in 1992.
The bottom-line of all this is that the relative income of the typical
individual is increasingly being determined not only by geography (the
country in which she resides), but also by her relative position in the income
hierarchy within her country of residence. While the between-country
dimension is still more signiﬁcant in determining her position in the global
income line-up, the factor of within-country inequality is slowly but surely
catching up on it in importance. This already provides reason enough for
those of us who agree with Milanovic that global inequality is a topic ‘whose
time has come’ to spend much more time than we have up to now on trying
to understand the causes and consequences of within-country inequality. But
that is not the only reason, as the next section will show.
The consequences of within-country inequality
The EHII data represented in Figure 1 above indicate that developing LMICs,
on average, are much more unequal than either the low- and middle income
transition economies or the high-income countries. On average over the
whole period covered by the EHII data developing LMICs scored 10 points
higher on the Gini index than high income countries, and in the case of low-
income countries the gap was as high as 13 Gini index points. The gap
between developing LMICs and the ex-socialist transition economies used to
be around 20 Gini points, but thanks to the sharp increase in inequality in the
latter group in the 1980s and 1990s, this gap had narrowed to only between
six and seven points by 1999. Do these diﬀerences in inequality levels matter?
Indeed, they do and for a variety of reasons, some of which are explored in
the volume edited by Cornia, in the two World Bank volumes being reviewed
here, and in a number of other recent publications. Contrary to an earlier
widespread belief that there was a trade-oﬀ between inequality and
development, and that high inequality was an unavoidable, if only temporary
corollary of economic modernisation, recent empirical ﬁndings indicate that
high levels of initial wealth and income inequality within countries deﬂate
subsequent growth prospects, and inhibit attempts to structure economic
growth so as to beneﬁt the poor.
14 Easterly has shown that inequality,
independently of other factors, is a large and statistically signiﬁcant barrier to
developing the institutional framework and human capital on which
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15 A recent study on inequality within Latin
American countries concludes that inequality hinders the implementation of
sensible macroeconomic strategies, retards demand, impedes the develop-
ment of pro-poor trade policies, limits the growth of human capital stocks,
raises social discontent, and limits the degree of political participation.
16 The
two major World Bank publications reviewed here, as well as the Cornia
volume, underwrite these conclusions and make a compelling case that
successful development policy demands that we look at the whole spectrum
of the income (and wealth) distribution in countries, in contrast to the
singular emphasis on the lower end of the spectrum—poverty reduction—
that has dominated development thinking for the past decade. The new
development consensus is that national economic equity is crucial for
economic and human development.
Focusing on the eﬀect of inequality on growth, Cornia and his colleagues
ﬁnd that there is a distinct curvilinear relationship between initial income
inequality and economic growth in subsequent periods, as depicted in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3. The curvilinear relationship between inequality and growth.
Source: G Cornia, T Addison & S Kiiski, ‘Income distribution changes and their
impact in the post-Second World War period’, in G Cornia (ed), Inequality, Growth,
and Poverty in an Era of Liberalization and Globalization, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004, p 45.
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high levels of inequality (at 40 and higher on the 100-point Gini index) can
have negative consequences. If we assume that economic agents adjust their
eﬀorts to comply with their perceptions of whether their relative position in
the distribution ranks corresponds to previous eﬀort, low inequality induces
free riding and can be conducive to labour shirking, which inhibits growth.
The curve section preceding point I
1 in Figure 3 represents such a situation,
where low inequality retards growth. As we move along the curve towards
higher levels of inequality, growth potential increases as levels of incentives
go up, leading to higher incomes for certain groups and potentially more
savings, which stimulates investment. However, there comes a point (I*)
where inequality is no longer positively associated with growth, and beyond
which the relationship sharply turns negative: I
2–I
3. In their econometric
tests Cornia and his colleagues determine 40 on the Gini index as the turning
point, I*, beyond which inequality becomes dysfunctional.
The dataset used for Figure 1 is not the same as the dataset used by Cornia
et al and one should therefore be careful not to extrapolate ﬁndings from the
one to the other without adjustments. It is likely that the turning point I*
beyond which inequality becomes dysfunctional lies somewhat higher than 40
in the EHII dataset used in Figure 1. Nevertheless, we have good reason to
believe that the majority of developing LMICs in particular have inequality
levels that put them in the danger zone, I* to I
3.
Why do high levels of inequality depress growth prospects? There is an
extensive literature on this question,
17 but some of the causal mechanisms
suggested by the literature under review are the following:
. High levels of inequality coincide with highly skewed access of groups to
power and inﬂuence. High inequality encourages more intense rent-
seeking activities by advantaged and powerful elites, which the poor and
disadvantaged cannot challenge because of their relative powerlessness,
and the result is that property rights and investment incentives are
undermined by the resulting widespread graft.
. High levels of inequality imply that a relatively large section of the
population has little or no assets with which to acquire credit. This failure
of credit markets leads to lower levels of investment in human capital,
and higher fertility rates among those at the lower end of the distribution,
thus depressing the growth potential of an economy.
. Concentration of wealth and income on one end of the spectrum leads to
distortions of the consumer market, creating smaller domestic markets
for non-luxury goods, and inhibits the development of balanced domestic
demand.
. Inequality increases social tension, or at least the expectation among
potential investors that tension may erupt, which places a lid on domestic
and foreign direct investment.
. In an era in which democratisation of polities is widespread the rich in
highly unequal countries fear that democratisation will lead to widespread
redistribution, and hence shift their wealth oﬀshore. While this enhances
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potential opposition of the rich elite against democracy), the eﬀect is to
starve the local economy of savings and investment. In countries where
much of the wealth of the rich is immovable, such as land, opposition by
the elite against democratisation is much more pronounced and the
prospects of civil conﬂict and right-wing coups d’etat much greater, with
disastrous consequences for growth and human development. Latin
America provides good examples of how the concentration of land
ownership favours the emergence of reactionary politics.
. High levels of income inequality is associated with a large divergence
between the rich and the rest of the society in terms of access to political
power and inﬂuence. This undermines attempts at democratising these
societies, as the poor and the middle class lose conﬁdence in the political
institutions to improve their relative situation. Populist coups or other
forms of extra-constitutional political action then become attractive.
. However, the negative relationship between inequality and political
stability is not linear. High levels of income inequality reﬂect large
disproportionalities in political power and collective action-resources in a
society. In these societies, inequality is associated with more, not less
stability, as the have nots ﬁnd it diﬃcult to stage any eﬀective political
challenge against the haves.
As the World Bank’s 2006 World Development Report (WDR) makes
abundantly clear, economic growth and political stability are not all that
we should be concerned about when considering the eﬀects of inequality.
Human development includes economic modernisation, increases in prosper-
ity, and democracy. But it also involves improvements in the overall
capabilities of people to lead healthy and rewarding lives, which in turn is
dependent on the ability of countries to develop stable economic, political
and social institutions that would generate and support the policies that are
necessary to achieve better overall human development. High levels of
inequality prevent the emergence of those institutions, such as political
accountability, property-rights protection, a transparent legal order, and
general access to educational opportunities and health care that can
guarantee human development.
18 In addition, the 2006 WDR argues:
Equity in the acquisition of human capacities—through early childhood devel-
opment, formal education, health services, and social protection—is at the core
of a strategy to equalise the opportunities for people to lead productive,
fulﬁlling lives. Broad provisioning of these services is also good for devel-
opment and poverty reduction through impacts on innovation, productivity,
and social cohesion.
19
So, although within-country inequality is only one of two constituents
of global inequality, the publications under review supply abundant evi-
dence that this share is growing and that the high levels of inequality
common to developing LMICs, and the rising levels of inequality in transition
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prospects of all their residents. This implies that we have to emphasise
domestic redistribution and restitution to a much greater degree than used to
be common during what Cornia and his colleagues call ‘the era of liberali-
zation and globalization’, also known as the era of the neoliberal Washington
Consensus. Fortunately, we seem to have taken leave of that era now.
Redistribution for the sake of equity
There has rightly been much emphasis placed recently on the challenge of
global distributive justice, and two of the publications under review are quite
explicit in advocating it. We saw above how Milanovic emphasises the
democratisation of the institutions of global governance as a means towards
greater global distributive justice. Refreshingly, the 2006 WDR also places the
challenges posed by inequality into a broader, global perspective. The ﬁnal
chapter of this report is devoted to an analysis of what must be done by the
global community to promote the conditions under which greater political,
social and economic equity would become permanent features of developing
and developed states alike. This chapter contains a spirited plea for making
global market forces work more equitably by opening domestic markets of
the North to imports from the South, for setting trade rules that are fairer to
developing countries, for lifting the draconian constraints imposed by
developed countries on international labour ﬂows, for improving develop-
ment assistance by increasing and better targeting aid ﬂows, and for linking
aid more directly to the relieving not only of poverty, but also of income and
wealth inequalities in developing countries (through the joint ﬁnancing of
land redistribution schemes, for instance). While these suggestions are not
new and have been circulating among critics of the Washington Consensus
for some time, the wholehearted endorsement of them by an oﬃcial World
Bank publication does provide additional evidence that this Consensus is no
longer as cohesive as it used to be during the 1990s.
However, there is also a danger of over-emphasising the global dimension
of distributive justice, and here the focus of my critique is more directed at
cosmopolitans such as Milanovic than at the World Bank. One of the
perverse but unintended consequences of cosmopolitanism’s emphasis on the
importance of international (between-nation) redistribution has been to shift
moral blame and responsibility away from the governing elites of developing
countries. Now, there can be little doubt about the eﬀect of negative exter-
nalities on the way the international economy is conducted for producers and
consumers in vulnerable developing economies. Also, Thomas Pogge is
perfectly correct when he points out the major responsibilities that the old
states of the world carry for the deprivation that still characterises so much of
the younger states of the world.
20 Indeed, the norms, rules and practices of
the international state-centred regimes have been prejudicially in favour of
stabilising and legitimising rent-seeking activities by the often-corrupt ruling
elites of the new states, and against the interests of the poor and marginalised
within those states. However, that does not imply that these ruling elites
REVIEW ARTICLE
701carry no responsibility for the high levels of deprivation that characterise so
many new states in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
Unfortunately, so far cosmopolitanism has had little to say about and to
these ruling elites and about how they have failed to address the challenge of
redistribution within their countries. These rulers may want to hide behind
the excuse that globalisation and the macroeconomic policies that major aid
donors have imposed on them have restricted their room for manoeuvre with
respect to redistribution. We have seen that the coincidence of globalisation
and the global hegemony of supply-side macroeconomic thinking has indeed
worsened inequality in many developing countries, and one should not
assume that the choices of Third World leaders are totally unconstrained.
However, choices there always are and the well documented exploitative
strategies of ruling elites are as much, if not more, to blame for the low
performance of so many new states on indexes of human progress, such as
the Human Development Index. Moral cosmopolitanism is incomplete, and
misleading, for not addressing within-country inequality and the failure of
rulers to deal with it comprehensively and systematically.
There is a sense in which John Rawls’ refusal to extend the principles of
domestic distributive justice to the global arena is perfectly justiﬁed, despite
the widespread criticism that has been directed at his The Law of Peoples
(including criticism by Milanovic in his Worlds Apart book). A number of
authors has recently argued that Rawls was quite correct in stipulating that
principles of distributive justice can only apply to a collection of individuals
who have institutionalised among themselves the legitimate means of
coercion.
21 Aﬀecting the distribution of valued goods that are in short supply
relative to demand entails at least potentially the infringement of the auto-
nomy of persons. This equals coercion, which would be in need of justiﬁcation
to those who are aﬀected by it and who are interested in safeguarding their
autonomy. Put diﬀerently, only legitimate institutions can be instruments in
the promotion of distributive justice, given the implied coercion in distributive
and redistributive decisions. Such legitimate institutions, for the time being at
least, exist only at the level of the state, or in the case of the European Union
on the supranational level of an emerging confederation of states. No one
would want to argue that such legitimate distributive institutions exist for the
world as a whole and, as Nagel argues, it is unlikely that such institutions will
emerge before the creation of a single world political community. Legitimacy
is created by political institutions, not the other way around.
22 This is not to
deny that the practices of internationalregimes with near global scope, suchas
the World Trade Organization (WTO)o rt h eIMF, for instance, do have
distributive consequences. But these institutions were created as co-operative
schemes and receive their legitimacy as such, not as redistributive institutions.
The point of the above is that the state is, for the time being, the only
legitimate context within which relative deprivation can be addressed
through redistributive policies and practices. In terms of the discussion in
the early part of this essay, this implies that the morally appropriate place to
do something about global income inequality is ﬁrst and foremost in the
dimension of within-country inequality, that is, at the level of the state. This
REVIEW ARTICLE
702does not mean that between-country inequality can or should be ignored.
However, in terms of the full understanding of what redistribution entails, it
is a misnomer to speak of ‘global distributive justice’, except if we mean by
that the sum-total of distributive justice achieved by individual states. For it
is at the level of states only that the principles of distributive justice can and
may apply, as it is on this level alone that we have the institutional means to
legitimately take from the rich and give to the poor. To this we can add a
point that Robert Goodin makes, namely that the state is the functional unit
through which distributive justice can most eﬃciently be achieved, and that
the state should therefore be at the heart of any scheme to secure global
justice.
23 Thus, even if one rejects the restrictions that I impose on the appli-
cability of the principles of distributive justice, prudence would determine
that we place much more emphasis on within-country inequality and what to
do about it than current debates about global inequality imply. It is in this
regard that the 2006 WDR Equity and Development is especially to be
welcomed as a sign that ‘oﬃcial’ development thinking has turned an
important corner as far as domestic redistribution is concerned. Whether this
report will also lead to sustained international and domestic action to address
inequality within countries systematically is another question. However, what
should happen if we want to maintain the momentum is that the norm of
inequality reduction should become as enshrined as that of poverty relief in
the macroeconomic ‘suggestions’ that multilateral and bilateral donors of
oﬃcial development assistance make to recipients. There are good reasons to
believe that reducing inequalities through the redistribution of assets and
income could be an important policy tool for inducing poverty-reducing
growth (to be distinguished from growth per se). As the 2000/2001 WDR
comments: ‘while economic growth is systematically associated with poverty
reduction, the rate at which growth translates into lower poverty depends on
the initial level of inequality in the distribution of income and how that
distribution changes over time’.
24 An International Labour Oﬃce study by
Dagdeviren et al conﬁrms this conclusion. The authors ﬁnd that for almost
all of the countries in their sample a strategy of marginal redistribution of
wealth from the rich to the poor, or a strategy of equal distribution of growth
beneﬁts, is more eﬀective in reducing poverty than increases in economic
growth that are distributionally neutral.
25
The renewed emphasis on domestic redistribution as a proper and prudent
policy tool also implies that there rests a negative duty on the shoulders of the
rule makers in global regimes to weed out those norms and practices that
inadvertently restrain or deliberately discourage redistributive macroeco-
nomic policies in developing countries. Although this point can sometimes be
overdone, there is no doubt that open economies lose some control over the
setting of prices, that it becomes infeasible to depress the expected after-tax
rate of return on mobile capital, and that those in favour of redistribution,
such as trade unions, may have their bargaining power undermined in the
process.
26 However, it is an illusion to think that globalisation has totally
depleted the redistributive arsenal of the welfare state. Much can still be done
to promote equity in wealth and income in poorer countries, also by
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willing-seller, willing-buyer basis and the taxing of absentee landholding;
improving imperfections in the credit market so that the poor can gain access
to credit and start to build-up human and ﬁxed capital; and the use of
progressive taxation to fund general education and primary health care.
27
This is not incompatible with an endorsement of transnational attempts to
do something on a grand scale to reduce poverty incidence, such as the plea
that the 23 members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee should
double overseas development assistance (ODA) to developing countries over
the next decade. What is crucial to understand, however, is that there is no
guarantee that increased aid that is earmarked to ﬂow through the state
apparatus of developing countries will reach its intended targets, namely the
poor, if such states do not have functional redistributive strategies in place.
Thus, domestic redistribution in this sense is a prerequisite for eﬀective global
transfers, not the other way around. Generous and targeted foreign aid to
improve access to education, or to set up a credit facility for the poor, for
instance, can do much to promote the prospects for economic growth in the
medium and longer term, which will promote convergence in income levels
across nations. Within- and between-country inequality is thus intimately
related, but it is important that we conceptualise this link and its implications
correctly.
Therefore, it is important to remember that there is a crucial diﬀerence
between ODA transfers, no matter how large, and within-country redistribu-
tion. As we said above, only the latter can legitimately fall under the purview
of redistributive justice, and entails longer term attempts to improve equity
within a political community. As the experience of welfare states in northern
Europe shows, such redistribution continues even after absolute poverty has
been eradicated, because it is driven by considerations of distributive justice.
In contrast, foreign aid is and can only be driven by considerations of
humanitarian beneﬁcence, at least until such time that a single world political
community is created that can legitimate redistributive transfers that also go
beyond the goal of poverty relief. The humanitarian impulse behind foreign
aid is limited in time and in purpose. Once the incidence of absolute
deprivation has been reduced to zero, and this becomes self-sustaining, the
general humanitarian rationale for ODA disappears. Domestic redistributive
justice, on the other hand, is a continuous attempt to address the issue of
relative deprivation, irrespective of the incidence of absolute deprivation.
Conclusion
The recent publications and UTIP website under review suggest that there are
two sets of reasons to pay more attention to domestic inequality than is
common in the current ethical or policy-oriented literature. The one relates to
the fact that political–economic studies have over the past decade shown
that earlier beliefs about a trade-oﬀ between economic development and
income inequality cannot be sustained. A stream of evidence is emerging to
show that inequality at the high levels commonly seen in developing countries
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mechanisms. Crucially, having a high level of inequality makes it diﬃcult for
a country to translate economic growth into pro-poor growth.
The second reason has to do with the important normative distinction
between circumstances under which principles of distributive justice can
apply, and where they cannot. According to the approach to distributive
justice developed by John Rawls, and endorsed here, the use of coercion to
eﬀect the redistribution of resources/income/wealth can only be justiﬁed to
those who are aﬀected by it, if they share a set of political institutions with
the defender in terms of which coercion can be legitimated. This context is
provided by the state, and redistribution as an act of distributive justice must
be restricted to it. Cosmopolitans do their own cause a disfavour when they
ignore the within-country dimension of income inequality, which can be
shown to be the ‘natural focus’ of distributive justice.
None of the above implies that the terrible international levels of income
inequality should be left out of consideration, however. But we have to
appreciate that the transfer of resources between societies can not and should
not have the purpose of eﬀecting international distributive justice. The
purpose is and should be the humanitarian goal of reducing the incidence of
absolute deprivation and to promote development prospects. This goal is
worthwhile in its own right, and considerable transfers will be necessary to
achieve even the limited Millennium Development Goals. However, it is not
appropriate to categorise these transfers as part of distributive justice.
Once we have sorted out these conceptual and normative distinctions, the
task of all who are concerned about the high levels of global inequality is to
promote equity through redistribution as a primary national policy goal, and
to make sure that governments are woken up to this challenge, but also
empowered to take it on through global co-operative schemes.
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